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Abstract
In Europe, twelve countries have joined a currency union but
four have stayed out. The EU enlargement process implies a
large set of potential EMU entrants. In Latin America, two
countries have recently dollarized and regional currencies have
also been a recurring theme. We develop a theoretical model
in which countries are exposed to real and monetary shocks of
both a systemic and individual nature. The model suggests when
countries should ﬂoat, form a CU or ﬁx to an anchor as a function
of their sensitivity to systemic shocks and the size of individual
shocks. In an empirical analysis we consider a set of countries
in Latin America. We ﬁnd that what is beneﬁcial for a given
country depends on the actions of others. Integration may then
be path dependent, and all roads may not lead to Rome.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Mundell (1961), Mckinnon (1963) and Poole (1970) provided path-
breaking theoretical models to consider when countries should consider
adopting a common currency. These papers gave rise to what are now
referred to as the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) conditions. OCA
theory has hence become an essential element of the toolkit of inter-
national economists and these earlier papers have now spawned a wide
literature1. However, most OCA models are essentially two-country,
∗We are grateful for comments from Guillermo Calvo, Ernestto Stein, Alan Taylor,
Andrés Velasco and participants at the brainstorming session in Cambridge, USA and
the, "FTAA and Beyond: Prospects for Integration in the Americas" conference in
Punta del Este, Uruguay.
1See for example Bayoumi (1994) for a formal model of OCAs, Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1994) on OCA and Nafta, Bean (1992) on OCA and Europe, Buiter
(1999) on OCA and the UK, and Masson and Taylor (1993) and Willett (1999) for
more recent reviews.
1suggesting when a country should "ﬁx" to the other - which is often
thought of as the rest of the world. Such models are then restrictive in
analyzing a set of important issues, such as what is the eﬀect on a third
country when two other trading partners form a monetary union and
how two current members of a monetary union are aﬀected if a third,
fourth and ﬁfth country joins in and (hence) what the optimal member-
ship of a monetary union might be for a particular country. These are
not simply interesting theoretical issues but they are also of signiﬁcant
practical importance. In the context of EMU, 12 countries have now
adopted the single currency, while 4 EU members have stayed out. The
EU enlargement process implies a very large number of potential new
eligible members. In Latin America, 2 countries have recently dollar-
ized (Ecuador and El Salvador) while the majority have adopted more
ﬂexible regimes with ﬂoating exchange rates. A recurring theme is a
common regional currency, for example, among countries in Mercosur2.
The decision of El Salvador to dollarize has eﬀects on other countries
in Central America and if another country in the region dollarized that
would also aﬀect El Salvador. If the Southern Cone adopted a single
currency, that would be a very signiﬁcant development for the whole of
South America and beyond. To date, there does not appear to be a
simple theoretical framework capabale of analyzing the externalities of
one country’s decisions on others in a multi-country setting that might
be made applicable to these real world examples.
A second issue is the interplay with trade and free trade areas (FTAs).
Economists have a strong belief in the beneﬁts of trade integration. Yet
this unusual consensus within the profession has not been matched by
advances at the implementation stage when protectionist forces have
tended to delay the process of trade integration. The link between trade
and monetary integration is a subtle one. The common view might be
that trade integration is a necessary condition for monetary integration.
However, others might argue that monetary integration might provide
the impulse for trade liberalization and counter the protectionist forces.
The interplay between these two reforms is then highly signiﬁcant.
Again, Europe and the Americas provide interesting contrasts. In the
former, a single currency came about only after a signiﬁcant deepening of
trade integration whereas in the case of the Americas there is a dollariza-
tion debate in Latin America which at times appears quite independent
of the debate regarding FTAA. Nafta is deepening trade integration in
the north but there is less talk of a single currency between the current
three partners. Mercosur attempted to deepen trade integration in the
South and although as mentioned, a common currency has been a re-
2See for Carrera y Sturzenegger (2000).
2curring theme, Argentina in particular has also ﬂirted with the idea of
dollarization.
This paper constitutes a ﬁrst attempt at developing a simple frame-
work potentially capable of considering these various diﬀerent interaction
eﬀects. We develop what might be considered a "reduced form" version
of a OCA model and extend it to the case of n countries. More specif-
ically, our model might be described as the factor approach (or more
loosely CAPM) meets OCA.
We assume countries are aﬀected by four types of shocks; idiosyn-
cratic and systemic shocks, both real and monetary in nature. We then
develop equations for GDP volatility as a function of simple underly-
ing characteristics of countries and, in particular, their dependence on
systemic shocks (a type of beta coeﬃcient), the size (volatility) of the
idiosyncratic shocks, and the choice of exchange rate regime. While we
label shocks as real or monetary, they can be interpreted more widely as
shocks to which it would be desirable for the exchange rate to respond,
and shocks that might shift the nominal exchange rate away from some
desired path (in terms of GDP stabilization), respectively. This rela-
tively simple framework allows us to consider the eﬀect of a monetary
union in a subset of countries on the members of the union and on other
countries. We can also compare the case of a monetary union, where
monetary policy and hence exchange rates respond to the shocks to the
members of the union, with "dollarization" where monetary policy and
exchange rates are assumed to be governed by US (or the anchor coun-
try) characteristics. We illustrate these and other points in a set of
simulations.
We introduce trade integration and free trade areas as we posit that
countries that are more integrated will have a more similar dependence
on the systemic factors. Hence if an FTA increases integration, we then
have a link between trade and monetary integration. Broadly speaking
t h eg r e a t e rt h ed e g r e eo ft r a d ei n t e g r a t i o ni naC U ,t h e nt h el o w e ri s
the cost of a single currency between members. We illustrate that the
establishment of an FTA may then increase the argument for a currency
union (CU). At the same time, however, if a subset of countries forms
an FTA increasing the incentives for those countries to form a CU, then
this may have a deleterious eﬀect on other countries that are left out.
We also provide a ﬁrst empirical application of the model - to Latin
America. We conduct a principal component analysis to obtain the
systemic factors and the dependence of countries to those factors - the
"factor loadings". We then estimate, using a Vector Autoregression
(VAR) technology, the volatility of the idiosyncratic real and nominal
shocks. This analysis yields some interesting if preliminary results.
3The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide
the basic theoretical model. In section 3 we then consider a set of initial
simulations regarding CU’s and dollarization. In section 4 we present
the empirical application to Latin America and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 A reduced form OCA
Our model is a reduced form version of the OCA conditions inspired by
the early work of Mundell and Poole but that we think nests many views
regarding the costs and beneﬁts of currency unions. We start with an
initial output equation for a single country i of the form:
∆GDPi = ∆Ri − α∆Si. (1)
In this speciﬁcation, real shocks ∆Ri, which aﬀect output directly, can be
smoothed by exchange rate adjustments ∆Si .H e r e ,α is the smoothing
eﬀect of the exchange rate movement. In this speciﬁcation, the exchange
rate refers to the nominal exchange rate. The exchange rate in turn, is
determined by a "monetary approach to the exchange rate" equation as
follows,
∆Si = ∆GDPi − ∆Mi, (2)
where, as expected a positive monetary shock results in an exchange rate








which applies to countries under ﬂoat. Under a ﬁxr e g i m e∆Si =0 , so
that very simply:
∆GDPi = ∆Ri.
The beneﬁtt oc h o o s i n gaﬂoat is then that the exchange rate can act
as a shock absorber in the case of real shocks but also introduces the
possibility of monetary shocks that tend to move the exchange rate away
from this smoothing motion. In this speciﬁcation, real shocks can be
terms of trade, productivity or capital ﬂow disturbances (sudden stops).
Monetary shocks can relate to money supply disturbances or changes
in money demand not related to the real side of the economy. The
important aspect of our monetary shocks is that they are shocks that
drive the exchange rate away from desired changes given the conﬂuence
of real shocks.3. Relating the model to the early work of Mundell and
3We note that this set up abstracts from the ever-growing list of "new consider-
ations" that various authors have suggested should be included within OCA theory.
4o t h e r s ,ac o u n t r yt h a ts u ﬀers large "monetary" shocks may then ﬁnd it
should ﬁx whereas a country that has low monetary shocks but suﬀers
large "real" shocks should ﬂoat and use the exchange rate to smooth
those real disturbances.
A potential criticism of this set-up is that there appears to be no room
for independent monetary policy. However, for those that believe that
independent monetary policy can be employed to respond perfectly to
real shocks without suﬀering from any monetary shocks at all, then this
view can be translated simply into our model with the assumption that
the monetary shocks have a variance of zero and the alpha parameter
is very large. Then, GDP volatility is close to zero under a ﬂoat even
in the presence of real shocks. However, a more general view might be
that there are certain limitations to using monetary policy in this way
and that monetary variables may not be totally within the control of the
monetary authorities4.
Another view, stressed by Calvo - see for example Calvo (2002) - fo-
cuses on the severity and importance of "sudden stops". In our model,
a sudden stop might be thought of as a systemic real shock. As such,
shocks impact the real economy through a decline in available funds for
investment and in general require a signiﬁcant current account adjust-
ment. These are then shocks where it would in general be advantageous
t or e s p o n dw i t he x c h a n g er a t eﬂexibility5. To the extent that a group of
countries suﬀer from such a shock simultaneously implies that the cost
of a monetary union between those countries would be low, although
if an individual country was more prone to such a "sudden stop" then
individual exchange rate ﬂexibility would clearly be an advantage.
2.2 A factor approach to OCA
In the previous section we referred to one country in isolation. The
extension to many countries entails tracking the exchange rates between
countries. Suppose there are n + 1 countries (i.e: n +c o u n t r yi). Our
Willett (1999) includes as (new) considerations, "optimal public ﬁnance, the degree
of international currency substitution, the new classical view of policy eﬀectiveness,
the informativeness of price and quantity signals, the controllability of the money
supply, time inconsistency problems and credibility issues".
4As Buiter (1999) puts it, perhaps too strongly, "... objections to UK (EMU
membership) are based on the misapprehension that independent monetary policy,
and the associated nominal exchange rate ﬂexibility, can be used eﬀectively to oﬀset
or even neutralise asymmetric shocks. This ‘ﬁne-tuning delusion’ is compounded by a
failure to understand that, under a high degree of international ﬁnancial integration,
market determined exchange rates are primarily a source of shocks and instability"
(quoted from the abstract of the paper).
5We note however that this assumes that the shock is exogenous to the exchange
rate regime in place, we come back to these endogeneity issues below.
5equation for GDP is






where ∆Ri is a "real shock" that hits country i and where the real shock





w +  
R
i . (4)
Each country is aﬀected directly by individual shocks  R
i or in response
to world shocks  R
w with adjustment coeﬃcient β
R
i . Exchange rate
changes are governed by the monetary approach to the exchange rate
such that the nominal exchange rate is aﬀected by changes in relative
outputs and relative monetary supply. Thus
∆Sij =( ∆GDPi − ∆GDPj) − (∆Mi − ∆Mj). (5)
Where the relative money shock has, in similar vein to the real shocks,





w +  
M
i . (6)
Equations (5) and (6) imply that exchange rate movements are driven
by real and monetary shocks. In order to express the exchange rate
movement only in terms of these shocks, we ﬁrst compute the diﬀerence
in GDP movements of countries i and j. From equation (3):





(∆Sik − ∆Sjk). (7)
However, from our setup it follows that ∆Sij = ∆Sik − ∆Sjk and
hence this simplﬁes to:
∆GDPi − ∆GDPj = ∆Ri − ∆Rj − α∆Sij. (8)




[(Ri − Rj) − (∆Mi − ∆Mj)]. (9)
6And from the equation governing the changes in GDP we now have:







[(∆Ri − ∆Rj) − (∆Mi − ∆Mj)]. (10)
Which makes clear that for a country that has asymmetric real shocks
(ie: where its real shocks are diﬀerent to the other n countries), a ﬂoat-
ing exchage rate has a dampening role. On the other hand a country
that has asymmetric monetary shocks (e.g.: where individual monetary
shocks are large), a ﬂoating exchange rate may imply greater shocks to
GDP relative to a ﬁx. Subsituting in for the speciﬁcation of the real


























































We will idendity welfare with the inverse of GDP volatility. Given
that the systemic shocks and the individual shocks are all independent,
GDP volatility is now relatively straightforward in this world of n + 1




















































































O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i ft h e r ei so n ew o r l dc u r r e n c yt h e nw eh a v et h a t :
∆GDP
Fix
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i . (13)













Comparing this to the equation for GDP volatility under ﬂoating, we
can see that ﬂoating reduces GDP volatility derived from own asymetric
real shocks (idiosyncratic or systemic but where betas are diﬀerent),
to the extent that α is positive, but ﬂoating also introduces greater
GDP volatility stemming from the monetary shocks in other countries
(that aﬀect exchange rates domestically) and own asymmetric monetary
shocks.
2.3 Partial Monetary Unions
This simple set-up is useful in that it also allows us to consider what
happens when two or more countries form a currency union. If two
countries decide to adopt the same currency, then the basic equation
f o rG D Pm o v e m e n t sr e m a i n st h es a m ee x c e p tf o rt h ef a c tt h a tn o wo n e
currency dissapears.






w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a ti merges with k indicated by the subscript i(k).
We assume symmetry, in that all countries are of equal size and hence
have equal weight regarding how the common exchange rate of a mone-
tary union is determined. Denoting ∆Mi(k) = ∆Mk(i) as the monetary
shock of the monetary union between countries i and k, the common
exchange rate movement is then given by:
∆Si(k)j =
½
0 if j = k
∆GDPi(k)+∆GDPk(i)
2 − ∆GDPj − (∆Mi(k) − ∆Mj) if j 6= k.
(16)
We will assume that the movement of the joint exchange rate follows
the same rules as before with a systemic and an individual component
for the real shocks and monetary shocks. Following standard theories
of ﬁnance, the "beta" of the currency union is then simply the average
of the two individual country "betas" and the individual shock of the
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M
k ). (18)




[(∆Ri(k) − ∆Rj) − (∆Mi(k) − ∆Mj)],
w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a t∆Si(k)l = ∆Sk(i)l and ∆Si(k)l − ∆Sjl =
∆Si(k)j. We can then write the change in GDP, if i and k ﬁx, as a




















































































































































































































This equation can be extended to the case in which more than two
countries decide to conform a monetary union. If the monetary union is
between three countries, say i,k and l, then the exchange rate equation is























In this way, we can use this approach to consider partial mone-
tary unions including x+1 of the n+1 countries. The general equation




















































































































Although this formula is long it is fairly simple to interpret. It says
that as the number of countries forming a monetary union increases, if
t h eb e t a sa r ev e r yd i ﬀerent, then the exchange rate will not reﬂect well
the systemic real shocks that hits country i (ﬁrst term). This makes
intuitive sense, as the exchange rate in a very large monetary union of
diverse members will do little to smooth the systemic shocks of individual
10members. On the other hand, the eﬀect of the individual real shocks of
countries not in the union become less important (second term) as they
aﬀect less and less the exchange rate of the union, which is increasingly
driven by its members. Also, the exchange rate of the union is going
to reﬂect less the individual real shocks of country i (third term) and
hence smooths output less eﬃciently. There is a posistive eﬀect as the
exchange rate will also reﬂect less the individual monetary shocks of
the countries of the union (the ﬁfth term). The fourth term reﬂects
the asymetric monetary shocks and the best case for monetary union is
where the eﬀect of the union is to generate an "average beta" close to
the average beta of the n + 1 countries. The ﬁnal term indicates that
when the number of countries in the union increase then the individual
monetary shocks of countries not in the union become less important as
they aﬀect less the exchange rate of the union. Note that as x tends to
n, then this equation collapses to the equation for output volatility for
the one world currency case.
2.4 Fixing to an anchor currency
Alternatively countries may choose to coordinate by ﬁxing to a country
that can provide some credibility enhancement. We will refer to this
country as the US. The purpose of this section is to provide the sequence
of volatilities as more and more countries peg to the same currency. As
always we start with our canonical output equation






In this case, we can write that:







{(∆RUS − ∆Rj) − (∆MUS − ∆Mj)}
(23)
and going through the same procedure as above, we ﬁnd the variance of















































































If now a second country dollarizes, then the extension is reasonably
straightforward and if x countries plus country i dollarize then we obtain



















































































Dollarization then eliminates the dependence of output volatility on
the local monetary shock, replacing it with US monetary shocks, but
will import volatility to the extent that real and monetary shocks are
asymmetric. As the number of countries that dollarize increase, the im-
portance of the asymmetric real shocks increases (there are more terms
in the ﬁrst sumation) but the importance of US monetary shocks dimin-
ish. As x tends to n, this equation collapses onto that for the one world
currency (ﬁxed) case.
3 A Set of Simulations
3.1 The model in action to illustrate diﬀerent pos-
sibilities
In this section, we report the results of a set of simulations of the model.
Our aim is to understand the implications for GDP volatility under
diﬀerent exchange rate regimes of diﬀerent constellations of parameter
values. The model is simple but extremely general in that by varying
12a parsimonious set of variables, we obtain very diﬀerent results. The
diﬀerent parametrizations we adopt below are detailed in Table 1. The
simulations are labelled somewhat suggestively according to the ﬂavour
of the reults obtained.
Table 1 Here
3.2 G-3
In the ﬁrst simulation, the size of the individual real shocks are the
same as the size of the individual nominal shocks (all equal to 1). The
α parameter is set to 0.5 implying that a ﬂoating rate can substantially
smooth the real shocks. In this simulation all the β’s for all the coun-
tries are set equal to one and the volatility of the shocks are also the
same across countries. Figure 1 graphs one country’s GDP volatility a)
when that country forms a monetary union with an increasing number
of partners (the number of partners is the X axis), b) versus pegging to
one of the other countries (let us call it the US although in this simula-
tion the US is just another country - the number of countries pegged to
t h eU Si st h eXa x i s )c )v e r s u sﬂoating. Remember that ﬁx i n gt ot h e
US anchor and forming a monetary union both converge to the case of
one world currency as the number of countries that ﬁxi n c r e a s e s . A s
can be seen, ﬂoating is the best in terms of the lowest GDP volatility
followed by a partial monetary union, followed by a one world currency,
and ﬁnally ﬁxing to the "US". A monetary union is preferred to ﬁxing
to the US currency, as in a monetary union with two members, the mon-
etary policy more closely reﬂects the real shocks of those two members.
However, in this case, where ﬂoating is optimal, the cost of a monetary
union (that one country’s monetary policy does not relfect that coun-
try’s real shocks), outweighs the beneﬁt in terms of the diversiﬁcation
of "harmful" monetary shocks. Hence as the number of members of
the monetary union rises, the cost of the monetary union increases. In
this G3 inspired simulation, where harmful nominal shocks are no higher
than the real shocks, the best policy is to ﬂoat.
Figure 1 Here
3.3 EMU
In this second simulation, we make various changes. We assume that
the anchor country has relatively smaller nominal shocks and the other
13countries higher nominal shocks6. We also assume that the anchor coun-
try has a dependence on the systemic real factor that is higher than the
other countries (0.75 versus 0.25). We assume that the other countries
all have the same, lower, dependence on the systemic real factor. The
idea here is that the anchor is a more "systemic" country than the other
countries and also has smaller individual monetary shocks. We tenta-
tively suggest that these stylized facts might be thought of as modelling
Europe. Here we ﬁnd, as illustrated in Figure 2, that the best policy is
a monetary union. Monetary union is now superior to ﬂoating as the
beneﬁt of diversifying the nominal shocks outweighs the cost of adopting
a monetary policy that does not ﬁt one’s own characteristics - as given
by the real shocks. In common with results on diversﬁcation of ﬁnan-
cial assets, it is noticable how quickly the standard deviation of output
drops as a few more countries join the monetary union. After some 7 or
8 countries join, virtually all the beneﬁts of monetary union are dissi-
pated. In this simulation, pegging to the anchor is however better than
ﬂoating as the anchor has considerably lower monetary shocks. Again,
as more and more countries "ﬁx", both monetary union and ﬁxing to
the anchor converge and they converge on the standard deviation of the
one world currency. We then label this simulation EMU, as the model




In the third simulation, we increase the nominal (monetary) volatility
substantially higher thus increasing the relative attrativeness of the an-
chor’s (US’s) currency . In this case, as illustrated in Figure 3, dollariza-
tion is now the preferred option. Floating, of course, yields the highest
GDP volatility and while a currency union, (CU) diversiﬁes some of the
individual monetary shocks, ﬁxing to the low nominal volatility coun-
try (the US) is clearly preferred. We note that this relative attraction
of dollarization decreases as more countries "ﬁx". As more and more
countries "ﬁx", "dollarization", and a monetary union converge again
on the output volatility of a one world currrency.
6The anchor country is labelled the US in the graph but we could equally think of
it as Germany. In other words ﬁxing to the anchor would be adopting German mon-
etary policy whereas monetary union would be where the montary policy reﬂected
t h es h o c k so ft h ew h o l em o n e t a r ya r e a .
14Figure 3 Here
3.5 CU or dollarization: size matters
In Figure 4, we ﬁne-tune the costs and beneﬁt so faC Ur e l a t i v et od o l -
larization to illustrate an interesting case. Here the individual nominal
volatility is lower than in Figure 3 and the two curves cross. This im-
plies that if we consider a country dollarizing or forming a monetary
union with a single partner, then dollarization is preferred. This result
is obviously driven by the lower individual nominal volatility assumed
for the US. However, as the number of countries entering into the mon-
etary union rises, after a critical number of countries have entered, the
CU is then preferred! In this case output volatility of a monetary union
with 5 countries (country i plus 4 partners) is lower than that if those
ﬁve countries (country i plus 4 partners) dollarize. Now the diversif-
cation eﬀect of the CU has reduced substantially the problem of the
high individual nominal volatility, and in the CU, the monetary policy
more closely reﬂects the real shocks of the CU’s members - whereas with
dollarization, monetary policy reﬂects the real shocks of the US.
This result may give rise to a coordination problem. Suppose there
are say 6 countries in a world of 50 that might either dollarize or even-
tually form a CU but that the technology of CU formation is such that
only two countries can ﬁrst form a CU and only subsequently can that
CU be extended. The problem is that each two or three countries would
prefer to dollarize over the alternative of a small CU. Hence if the de-
cision of each country is to dollarize today versus form a CU with one
or two partners in the hope of convincing others to join later, then the
decision today might be dollarize. A CU with 6 members may then
never get oﬀ the ground even though it is the preferred solution for the
whole group.
Figure 4 Here
3.6 On endogenizing the eﬀect of trade integration
As suggested in the introduction, we might posit that the "real betas" of
two countries that are more integrated, will be more similar than those
of two countries that do not trade very much. This idea may provide
a link between trade agreements and monetary agreements. Also, for a
group of countries that join a CU, we might posit that the "monetary
betas" could also converge. This would be a way of making operational,
15Mundell’s idea that the traditional OCA criteria are to a large extent,
endogenous7.
To illustrate this possibility, we consider monetary union between
a country that has a real beta of 0.75 and a group of countries that
have dispersed real and monetary betas. The distribution of real betas
for these other countries is uniform between 0.1 and 0.9. We then
shrink the dispersion of that distribution towards 0.75. The result is
illustrated in Figure 5 and more detail on the parameterization is given
in the Appendix in Table A1. In the Figure, the variable S summarises
the disperson of the distribution with a S=1 implying total uniformity
(all betas equal to 0.75) and S=0 represents a uniform distribution in
the interval 0.1 to 0.9. As the real betas converge, the GDP volatility
falls. We might posit that forming a CU might speed this convergence
process. This means that as a CU is formed between a divergent group,
the relevant curve may not be the curve with those divergent betas but
rather the betas may converge and output volatility may fall to one of
the lower curves depicted in Figure 5. This graph then illustrates the
potential importance of endogenous convergence between members of a
CU.
Figure 5 Here
4 An Application to Latin America
In this section we report the results of an empirical exercise using the
model and applying it to Latin America. We identify the systemic shocks
and the factor loadings for countries to those systemic shocks by con-
ducting a principal component analysis based on the ﬁrst diﬀerence of
GDP and then on exchange rate movements in 6 countries across Latin
America and the US over the period 1980-19998.I n t h i s e x e r c i s e , w e
consider just the ﬁrst principal factor and in both cases this explains
close to 40% of the variation. The dependencies to the ﬁrst principal
factor across the diﬀerent countries are then used as the beta coeﬃcients
in our simulations and the ﬁrst principal factors from this analysis are
then the systemic real and monetary shocks respectively. The theo-
retical model and the empirical exercise could of course be extended to
7Of course a similar argument could be made for dollarization ie: the betas of a
country adopting the US currency might converge to US values.
8The six countries are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela.
We do not include Argentina due to the ﬁxed exchange rate during the period of
analysis.
16multiple factors - ie: more orthogonal systemic shocks and hence other
corresponding sets of beta coeﬃcients. We leave this for future work.
We then conduct a Vector Autoregression (VAR) for each country
where we have one equation for the log change in GDP and a second
equation for the log change in the nominal exchange rate - against the US
dollar. In the VAR we introduce the principal components as exogenous
variables. We then interpret the residuals from these regressions as the
individual real and monetary shocks respectively. Table 2 provides a
summary of the variables and their values for the diﬀerent countries
employed in this exercise. Finally we set the α parameter equal to
0.5 as in the simulations above. In fact we ﬁnd that the spirit of the
results are not very sensitive to diﬀerent values of the α parameter, in
terms of the eﬀects on output volatility of the relative exchange rate
arrangements. Given the number of assupmtions, the results should of
course be taken as suggestive rather than deﬁnitive.
Table 2 Here
4.1 Mexico
We ﬁrst consider the case of Mexico. Mexico, as can be seen from
Table 1, has higher individual monetary shocks relative to the average,
relatively low individual real shocks and the lowest "real beta" (depen-
dence on the real systemic shock principal component). It is therefore
not too surprising that ﬂoating is the worst exchange rate regime choice
for Mexico. Figure 6 illustrates that forming a monetary union low-
ers GDP volatility and we ﬁnd that a CU with Colombia, Chile and
Uruguay is the best on oﬀer. While Colombia has a higher "real beta",
its individual monetary shocks are low. Gains are also had in extending
the CU to Chile and Uruguay that also have low individual monetary
shocks. However, incorporating Venezuela and especially Brazil, with
their higher individual monetary shocks, worsens the output volatility of
the CU for Mexico. Dollarizing also lowers GDP volatility for Mexico
and indeed is slightly better than a CU with Colombia. However, the
optimal policy for Mexico is a CU with Colombia, Chile and Uruguay.
Figure 6 Here
4.2 Brazil
Turning to the case of Brazil, Table 2 shows that Brazil has average
levels of the beta parameters, a low value for the individual real shock
17but a high value for the individual monetary shock. Here, due to the
higher individual monetary shocks, the beneﬁt of dollarizing or a CU are
substantially increased relative to ﬂoating. Figure 7 shows that for the
case of Brazil, extending the CU to all 5 other countries provides beneﬁts
- the full extension of the CU working to diversify Brazil’s individual
monetary shocks. However, the optimal policy, according to this strictly
economic criteria, is dollarization, which is preferred even compared to
the CU including all countries.
Figure 7 Here
4.3 Chile
A simulation for the case of Chile is illustrated in Figure 8. Chile has
a relatively high value for the "real beta", a low value of the "monetary
beta" and low real and monetary individual shocks. Dollarization is
worse than ﬂoating for Chile. However, a monetary union with Colombia
is the preferred option and output volatility is only slightly increased if
Uruguay is also admitted. However, if Brazil is added to the CU,
then this becomes worse for Chile than ﬂoating or even dollarizing! If
we change the order such that we have Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico,
Venezuela, Brazil then as before a CU with Colombia or Colombia and
Uruguay is preferred. Adding Mexico and Venezuela serves to increase
GDP volatility, although it remains just below the GDP volatility of
ﬂoating. Adding Brazil makes GDP volatility for much Chile higher
than ﬂoating.
Figure 8 Here
4.4 Exchange rate disagreements
This empirical exercise illustrates some of the potential conﬂicts re-
garding exchange rate arrangements in Latin America. For example,
according to this strictly economic exercise, Brazil should prefer to dol-
larize, Mexico would like to have a CU with Colombia and Chile, but
Chile would prefer to have Colombia and Uruguay in a CU and not in-
clude Mexico. If we are considering just CU’s, while Brazil would prefer
a CU with all 7 members, neither Chile nor Mexico would wish to have
Brazil in a CU. Of course, these results should only be considered highly
tentative and by no means deﬁnitive, but they give some ﬂavor to the
types of conﬂicts that might be present. It is perhaps not so surprising
18that despite the repeated debates about CUs in the region, little has
actually happened!
4.5 Endogenous betas and reducing individual mon-
etary shocks
As discussed above, these results assume that the beta coeﬃcients
and especially the individual monetary shocks remain constant despite
the changes in monetary regimes discussed. We might for example
expect the "monetary betas" and the "real betas" to converge with
greater integration. Moreover, it might also be argued that with a
multi-national central bank in charge of the monetary policy of a CU,
this would boost central bank independence and credibility and that
would then reduce the size of the individual monetary shocks9.W e c a n
also use the model to attempt to gauge how important these eﬀects are.
In Figure 9-11 we consider the convergence of the real betas, the mone-
tary betas and the reduction in size of the individual monetary shocks
for Mexico, Brazil and Chile respectively. Speciﬁcally, we put the real
betas and then subsequently the monetary betas all equal to their av-
erage values and then we reduce the individual monetary shock size of
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela half the way towards that of Chile as a
result of a monetary union10. The Figures tell a similar story.
The convergence of the betas appears insigniﬁcant in terms of reduc-
ing the GDP volatility, but reducing the size of the individual monetary
shocks has a sizeable impact. Of course, if such a change could be
eﬀected under another regime, then the attractiveness of that regime
would also rise. For example, if the recent adoption of inﬂation tar-
getting in Mexico and Brazil led to a reduction in individual monetary
shocks along Chilean lines, then ﬂoating would become more attractive.
In fact we suggest that this result supports the view that greater em-
phasis should be placed on the governance structure of central banks.
If a multi-national central bank provides a way to enhance the indepen-
dence and credibility of monetary policy, then the results here suggest
that that would provide a signiﬁcant boost to the attractiveness of a
regional currency.
9In contrast to other countries that have adopted inﬂation targeting, the Central
Banks of Brazil and Mexico lack formal independence and speciﬁc legislation setting
out their policy objectives. With a currency union, we might expect some institu-
tional advances for the common Central Bank and less political interference in policy
making.
10While this is arbitrary it seems reasonable as a way of capturing the potential
credibility gain.
19Figures 9-11 Here
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have developed a simple theoretical framework that
might be thought of as a reduced form of the OCA conditions capable of
being extended to an n-country world. The model combines a CAPM or
factor approach with systemic and individual shocks, with the idea that
for some sorts of shocks it is valuable to have exchange rate ﬂexibility
(the real shocks) whereas for other (monetary) shocks ﬂexiblity may
represent a cost.
A set of simulations shows the model in action. We illustrate how,
by varying the parameters of the model, diﬀerent cases can be analysed
and, perhaps most importantly, how one country’s decisions may impact
on others’ GDP volatility. Depending on parameter values ﬂoating, a
monetary union, or dollarization might be the best option for a par-
ticular country. Interestingly, as more countries join a CU, there is a
tradeoﬀ between the diversiﬁcation eﬀect (diversifying individual mon-
etary shocks) against a cost of including more countries with diﬀerent
sensitivities to the systemic real shock - the "real betas". One possibility
is that dollarization might be preferred to a small CU but that a larger
CU with a greater diversiﬁcation of the individual monetary shocks is
dominant. Depending on the technology of CU formation, this might
imply a coordination problem among countries.
We have also explored how, if trade and monetary integration im-
pacts the betas coeﬃcients, then this may imply that a CU is more
attractive. For example, if trade integration implies a convergence of
the "real betas" and monetary integration implies a convergence of the
"monetary betas", the cost of a CU is reduced. The advent of FTAA
might then be thought of as sparking greater trade integration and hence
a convergence of the real betas in the context of our model.
Finally, we have conducted a ﬁrst empirical exercise considering 6
countries in Latin America. Speciﬁcally, for Mexico, Brazil and Chile
we have compared dollarization to diﬀerent combinations of CUs between
the 6 countries to ﬂoating. The results, based strictly on these economic
criteria suggest that Brazil should prefer to dollarize, Mexico would like
to have a CU with Colombia and Chile, but Chile would prefer to have
Colombia and Uruguay in a CU and not include Mexico. If we are
considering just CU’s, Brazil would prefer a CU with all 6 countries but
neither Chile nor Mexico would wish to have Brazil in the CU. For Chile,
the gains of entering the preferred CU over ﬂoating are small whereas
the gains for Mexico and especially Brazil from their preferred CUs, (or
20dollarizing) are quite signiﬁcant. The results then indicate the potential
for signiﬁcant conﬂict when it comes to exchange rate arrangements in
the region. This may be part of the reason why little has happened
regarding exchange rate coordination. Finally, we have investigated
how these results might change if the beta coeﬃcients converge to their
average values for these countries as, say, an FTAA is formed and a
regional CU is put in place. We also compute what would happen,
perhaps as a result of the formation of a multi-national central bank,
if the individual monetary shocks in Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela (the
high individual monetary shock countries of the group) are reduced.
We ﬁnd that the convergence of the betas leads to virtually no change
in our results - it is just not quantitatively important. However, we
ﬁnd a very signiﬁcant gain from the reduction in individual monetary
shocks. We conclude therefore that when it comes to analyzing the
potential costs and beneﬁts of a regional CU, the emphasis should be
placed on the potential beneﬁts of enhancing the governance structure
of a multi-national central bank that might increase monetary policy
credibility and reduce the size of individual monetary shocks and less
emphasis on the costs of a lack of trade integration.
We consider this as very much a ﬁrst attempt at applying this general
theoretical framework to a practical example. We oﬀer the results as
suggestive rather than deﬁnitive. We hope that the theoretical ideas
of how to model OCA conditions in a very simple way may provoke
further interest in trying to pin down what the real and the monetary
individual and systemic shocks are and how they might be best estimated
in practice. We believe the theoretical framework could be substantially
further developed and used to analyze a set of interesting questions in
multi-country versions of optimal currency area theory and in many
practical applications.
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